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We develop a simple model in which ﬁnancial imperfections can
serve to stabilize aggregate ﬂuctuations and not merely aggravate
them as in much of the previous literature; we term this a ﬁnancial
decelerator.
In our model agents borrow to purchase housing and secure their
loans with this long-lived asset. There are two ﬁnancial imperfections
in this model. First, agents are unable to commit to repay their loans
— that is, they can strategically default. This limits the amount
that lenders are willing to oﬀer. In addition, however, lenders are
also imperfectly informed as to a borrower’s propensity to default;
that is, there is adverse selection. The latter imperfection implies
that default may actually occur in equilibrium, unlike in much of the
previous literature.
For relatively high house prices the commitment problem ensures
that the equilibrium is typically characterized by a standard ﬁnancial
accelerator; that is, the borrowing constraints which prevent default
become tighter as falling prices reduce the wealth with which agents
can collateralize future loans, thereby exacerbating aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions. However, we show that when prices are low, agents will default,
which serves as a stabilizing force.
Keywords: Financial accelerator, default, collateral, credit history
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D52, E44, G12, G21, G33.
21 Introduction
Much recent economic research develops the idea that ﬁnancial factors can
aggravate real ﬂuctuations. The common theme of this work is that informa-
tional asymmetries may introduce ineﬃciencies into ﬁnancial markets that
are particularly acute in times of economic downturn. A prominent example
is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).1 In this work, it is typically the case that a
shock to the economy lowers the value of some asset that is used to secure
ﬁrms’ borrowing, thereby aggravating asymmetric information problems and
making external ﬁnancing more diﬃcult to obtain; this, in turn, lowers aggre-
gate output and, hence, asset prices, even further. Similarly, in the context of
housing markets, Stein (1995) constructs a model in which drops in housing
prices mean that after paying their loan, households have less money avail-
able to use as a down payment for a new house and so are less likely to be
able to move, further depressing housing prices.2
It is the aim of this paper, by contrast, to develop a simple model that
has the feature that some ﬁnancial imperfections may actually serve as a
stabilizing force. The key mechanism whereby we obtain stabilization in our
model is that default may actually occur in equilibrium; by contrast, in most
of the existing literature, the borrowing constraints ensure that agents make
their promised payments in every eventuality.
In our model agents borrow to purchase housing and secure their loans
with this long-lived asset. There are two ﬁnancial imperfections in this model.
First, in common with the previous literature, agents are unable to commit
to repay their loans — that is, they can strategically default. This limits the
1See also Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kashyap, Scharfstein, and Weil (1990),
Gertler (1992), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
2See also Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2005), who construct a life-cycle model of housing
markets in which agents face credit constraints; among other conclusions, they show that
the magnitude of housing price ﬂuctuations can exceed those of GDP.
3amount that lenders are willing to oﬀer. In addition, however, lenders are
also imperfectly informed as to a borrower’s propensity to default; that is,
there is adverse selection. The latter imperfection implies that default may
actually occur in equilibrium.
For relatively high house prices the commitment problem ensures that
the equilibrium is typically characterized by a standard ﬁnancial accelerator;
that is, the borrowing constraints that prevent default become tighter as
falling prices reduce the wealth with which agents can collateralize future
loans, thereby exacerbating aggregate ﬂuctuations. However, we show that
when prices are low, agents will default, which serves as a stabilizing force;
we term this a ﬁnancial decelerator.
The key reason for this is the fact that under adverse selection what
appear as borrowing constraints are actually endogenous and in fact result
from the best agents’ optimizing behavior. When collateral values are low,
however, agents may ﬁnd it too costly to respect these constraints. This
then leads to two possible outcomes. Either the bad types will default on
their current loans, despite the cost this entails to their reputation or credit
history; this will leave them with more income precisely in those states in
which house prices are low. Alternatively, the good types may increase their
borrowing, which will make the bad types willing to repay now, but at the
cost of allowing them to default in the future (because they have borrowed
more). In either case current spending on housing will be higher, which will
mitigate the decline in its price.
From this discussion one can see that the important feature of this story
is the interaction between adverse selection and strategic default. Default
is strategic in our model in the following sense. First of all, repayment is
always an option in that agents do indeed have suﬃcient funds to cover their
debts even when house prices fall. In addition, agents act strategically in
weighing the costs and beneﬁts of defaulting against those of repaying. Some
4of these costs are direct, in the form of the value of the collateral (house)
that is surrendered upon default, as well as a personal cost of bankruptcy
that each agent incurs; but they are also indirect, in the impact of default
on a borrower’s reputation.
We note that the type of strategic default we have in mind — waves of
default that are correlated with declines in asset prices — is seen by many to
have featured in the Texas housing crash of the mid-1980’s. This is illustrated
in the following statement by Judith Dedmon, head of Fannie Mae’s Dallas
oﬃce in 1987: “[i]n some neighborhoods, the homeowners would walk the
house and go down the street and buy the same house at half the price.”
(The Dallas Morning News, March 18, 1996). The message of this paper is
that strategic default can actually have the eﬀect of stabilizing the housing
market and that the impact on the economy might have been even more
severe had borrowers been forced to repay all that they owed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The following section provides further
discussion of the model. The model itself is presented in section 3; we ﬁrst
introduce the various types of agents, deﬁne our notion of equilibrium and
then derive agents’ optimal responses under various scenarios. Section 4 is
devoted to the equilibrium. We ﬁrst discuss the equilibrium of the borrowing
game. We then show under which circumstances a ﬁnancial accelerator or
decelerator would arise in our model. In section 5 we compute some examples
that illustrate the general results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2 Discussion
In this section we discuss several aspects of the model, provide further refer-
ences to the literature, and present some empirical evidencethat is supportive
of our model and its assumptions.
First of all, we are not the only ones to develop a model in which ﬁnancial
5imperfections can stabilize ﬂuctuations. Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) show
that the agency costs facing credit-constrained ﬁrms can be aggravated by
certain positive aggregate shocks (in particular a decline in the cost of funds),
which thereby allows these agency costs to serve as a dampening force. This
mechanism is rather diﬀerent from that in our paper. In particular, neither
price ﬂuctuations (aside from interest rate changes) nor their eﬀects on col-
lateral values play a role in their paper. House (2002) shows that in models
where ﬁnancial imperfections lead to an over-investment problem, aggregate
ﬂuctuations that generate a decline in entrepreneurs’ net worth may actually
be more than oﬀset by this over-investment.
Our model requires that for default to play a role in mitigating business
cycles, consumers must be able to retain (non-housing) wealth even after de-
faulting. We note that “deﬁciency judgments,” which provide for a recovery
of the diﬀerence between the unpaid loan balance and the property’s liqui-
dation value through attachment of the mortgagor’s other assets, are either
prohibited or restricted by quite a few states and, in any case are, limited by
the mortgagor’s ability to declare bankruptcy.3 In addition, the FHA has a
policy of not pursuing deﬁciencies on its loans.
This paper also builds on game-theoretic models of credit markets and
reputation, such as Diamond (1989). As in Diamond’s paper, default is
strategic, and lenders update their beliefs concerning borrowers’ creditwor-
thiness based on whether or not they have defaulted in the past.
We are also not the ﬁrst to model default in general equilibrium. More for-
mal general equilibrium models of default and collateral can be found in Ke-
hoe and Levine (1993), Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1989, 2005),4 while
credit history is carefully modeled in general equilibrium by Bose (1996).
3C.f. Clauretie and Herzog (1990).
4For an application of default costs to housing markets with asymmetric information,
see Brueckner (2000).
6Finally, one component of the stabilizing eﬀect of default is an endoge-
nous transfer of income from the lending sector to strategic defaulters when
housing prices fall, which is made up for by a compensating transfer when
prices are high and there is no default (in the form of a higher interest rate).
In our model, the resulting losses incurred by this sector do not impact either
its demand for housing or its ability to lend further. Although this is cer-
tainly a restrictive feature of our model, we have in mind a situation in which
the negative impact of these losses is smaller than the positive eﬀect of the
additional funds available to the strategic defaulters. This is in fact a natural
outcome of most models in which agents have a choice between consumption
and lending — those with the lower marginal propensity to consume out of
current income will naturally emerge as the lenders.5 Likewise, although we
assume here that the supply of funds is perfectly elastic so long as lenders
break-even in expectation, our results would continue to hold, albeit more
weakly, as long as the lending sector was not perfectly inelastic. Finally,
we do not model the possibility that reserve requirements could constrain
banks in such a manner that an increase in default would leave them with
fewer funds to lend. While such an eﬀect would again mitigate our ﬁnancial
decelerator, it would likely not eliminate it completely.
3 The Model
3.1 Introduction
We work with a two-period model of the economy, in which the periods are
denoted 1 and 2. There are two goods, a perishable numeraire and housing,
the latter a long-lived asset from which agents accrue utility in each period
they consume it. Since it is long-lived, housing is available for use as collateral
5On this see Tobin (1975).
7on loans. The supply of housing will be ﬁxed at 2 units.
The price of the perishable numeraire good will be normalized to 1 in
every state. In period 1, the housing price will have two possible values: p1u
and p1d, each of which occurs with probability 1/2. In order to make the
interpretation of the model cleaner, we will restrict attention to parameter
values that yield equilibria for which p1u > 1 >p 1d. Conditional on being
in a particular node of period 1, there will be a single period-2 value for
the housing price, either p2u, if the current price is p1u,o rp2d, if it is p1d.
That is, all uncertainty is resolved in period 1. To generate a source of
price ﬂuctuations in the cleanest manner possible we assume that there is
a measure 1 − σ of non-strategic agents who serve as an outside source of
demand for housing in period 1 (only). We return to these agents below
when we discuss the determination of the equilibrium house price.
There is a competitive banking sector in this model that is always willing
to lend the numeraire on terms that provide it an expected return of 1, and
which has income-inelastic demand for housing. That is, we work in a small
open economy. This is discussed further below.
To simplify the contractual environment, we also make the following ad-
ditional assumptions regarding lending contracts. First of all, we restrict
attention to standard debt contracts, in which the gross interest rate is r for
each unit borrowed and in which the house serves as collateral for the loan.
We do not justify this assumption, although we note that nearly all mortgage
contracts have this form.
In addition, we assume that there are no deﬁciency judgments — that
is, should a borrower refuse to pay, the lender does not have recourse to
any assets other than the housing purchased with the proceeds of this loan.
Finally, we assume that the collateral can always be costlessly transferred
from the borrower to the lender.
We will primarily be interested in the consumers of housing, who we will
8sometimes also refer to as “strategic agents.” We assume that they have a
measure σ and that they share the following characteristics:
• Each agent enters period 1 with two units of housing.
• We also assume that they have ﬁnanced the purchase of this housing
by borrowing two units of the numeraire (as in Stein, 1995), and they
have used the housing to secure this debt (although for low values of
the house price it may not suﬃce to cover the entire loan). Note that
the gross interest rate r0 on this debt, which is due (in period 1), must
be determined endogenously in equilibrium, since it will depend on the
fraction of agents who choose to default in period 1.
The timing of repayment and consumption is as follows. At the start of
period 1 the exogenous shock to housing demand is realized, which leads to a
market clearing price of either p1d (the bottom node) or p1u (top node). An
agent ﬁrst makes a repayment on his initial loan of 1; this repayment may be
partial (for example, if he defaults and surenders his collateral). He then has
an opportunity to borrow further; the rate lenders charge him depends on
whether or not he repaid his loan in full. Finally, he is able to consume from
his wealth, which is the sum of whatever he retains after repaying his loan
and his borrowing. In period 2, there is no further realization of uncertainty.
He ﬁrst makes a repayment and then consumes; there is no further borrowing.
This timing is illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2 Consumers
Consumers consume only housing in period 1, and both housing and the
numeraire in period 2.6 Conditional on the realization of uncertainty in
6By restricting consumption to housing in period 1 we simplify the model by avoiding
having to distinguish between secured and unsecured loans. In any case, for the parameter
9Figure 1: Timing of the Model
period 1, an agent consuming (h1i,h 2i) units of housing and x2i units of the
consumption good (in period 2) accrues the following utility:
v(hi,x i) = log[h1i]+( x2i + log[h2i]),
where i ∈{ u,d}.
Agents will have income i1 ≡ i =1 /2 in either node of period 1 (this is
high enough so that default is truly strategic for the parameters we consider),
and we will assume that their income in period 2 is suﬃciently high so that
their period-2 housing consumption is income-inelastic. (i2 > 2 would suﬃce;
note that they have quasi-linear utility). As a result, the equilibrium price
will be p2 =1 /2 in either node of period 2.
In addition agents also have a ﬁxed personal cost of default, denoted by
k ∈ [0,1], which is subtracted from their utility in any period in which they
default. So for example, conditional on being in the bottom node, an agent
values we consider, even with quasi-linear utility in both periods, agents would not be able
to borrow enough to consume the numeraire in period 1.
10with cost k who defaults in period 2 (but not period 1) would obtain utility
v(hi,x i) − k.
Agents are distinguished by this cost of default. We will assume that a
fraction 1 − β of the consumers are “good” in that they have a high cost
of default k = 1, while the other β are “bad” and have a lower cost k,
with k ∈ (0,1/2]; later we will characterize the equilibrium as we vary this
cost k. We also assume that this cost is private information — lenders do
not observe it directly, although borrowers’ behavior can be used to make
inferences about it.
In employingdefault costs, we follow Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005),
although for simplicity we take these costs as ﬁxed, rather than as increasing
in the default. These costs can be interpreted as a household’s “stigma”
from a bankruptcy ﬁling or else as summarizing the cost associated with
bankruptcy, such as time wasted in court. Since we do not want to arbi-
trarily exclude defaulters from credit markets (unlike Allen (1981) or Kehoe
and Levine (1993) and many others), we must discourage default through
these costs. In addition, since it is natural to interpret these costs as being




We now specify how consumers optimize in this model.
There are four prices and four interest rates in this model.
As far as the prices, they are p1u in the top node of period 1 and p1d in
the bottom node, and p2u and p2d in period 2. For the interest rates, we have
r0, which is the rate for the loan the agents must repay at the beginning of
period 1 (regardless of the state of nature). For simplicity we will restrict
11attention to parameter values such that there is only default in the bottom
node of period 1 (when the house price goes down). In particular, we will
have p1u >r 0 in equilibrium.
Next there is ru, which is the interest rate paid in the top node of period
2 on loans taken out in the top node of period 1. However, we will focus
attention primarily on the bottom node because that is where default occurs
(since p1d < 1); in the appendix we brieﬂy discuss what occurs in the top
node in equilibrium.
In the bottom node the interest rate charged is denoted rd (it is paid in
period 2 on account of borrowing in period 1). In addition, as we will see
below, it will also be conditional on an agent’s repayment behavior in period
1, as well as on how much is borrowed.
Given the quasi-linear structure of preferences, agents’ decisions are:
• Whether to default on their original loan in a given node of period 1.
• Given their default decision, how much to borrow
• Whether or not to repay in the ﬁnal period (depending on the node
and on how much they borrowed in the previous period)
3.3.2 Borrowing Constraints
Given that agents are free to default in this model, lenders of course impose
borrowing constraints. The natural constraint in our model is that lenders
will not oﬀer more than the best agent in a given pool would repay. That
is, while it may be the case that the “bad” agents default in a pooling equi-
librium, the good agents must repay, since otherwise lenders would not be
able to break even.7 This is an important characteristic of our model; as we
7This is actually slightly stronger than is needed in the initial period; because of the
uncertainty, it would be possible for all agents to default in the bottom node, but for
simplicity we maintain the same constraint throughout the model.
12have already noted, classic ﬁnancial accelerator models typically rule out any
default whatsoever in equilibrium.
In the initial period (period 0), since the debt is ﬁxed at 2 units, and
agents’ income in the following period is i1 =1 /2, this constraint leads rather
to a restriction on parameter values so as to ensure that the good agents are
able to repay in the low state, that is, for which 2 × (r0 − p1d) ≥ i1 =1 /2i n
equilibrium, where r0 will be determined below.
The constraints are more complicated in period 1. In general, for an agent
whose default cost is known by lenders to be κ and with period-1 income i,
the maximal borrowing bmax(i,κ) that is consistent with this agent repaying
in the following period satisﬁes:




The left-hand side is derived by noting that his spending on housing in period
1 will be i + bmax, and so his wealth in period 2 will be (i + bmax) ×
p2j
p1j;i n
addition he owes bmax from his period-1 borrowing (the gross interest rate will
be r1 = 1 because the constraint ensures that he will repay). The right-hand
side is simply the disutility of defaulting in period 2.
We now focus attention on the bottom node (the top node is discussed
in the appendix).
The simplest constraint arises for those agents who default in period
1. We will show below that only the bad types will do so in equilibrium.
Since their default will allow them to retain all of their income i1 =1 /2 (and






The solution to this is bmax(1/2,k)=
4kp1d+1
4p1d−2 .
By contrast, for those agents who do not default in equilibrium, we must
13have





This diﬀers from the above constraint because (i) the agents’ period-2 wealth
also depends on what they have left over after repaying in period 1, (ii) the
interest rate r1j is not necessarily 1, and ﬁnally (iii) the best agents in the pool
(who determine the constraint) have a default cost of 1. A messy expression
for bmax(1/2−2(p1j −r0),1) can be derived, although in the interests of space
we will not do so here.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Concept
Since this is a model of adverse selection in which pooling and separation
play a major role, we choose to work with the Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium,
as in Miyazaki (1977) and Wilson (1977). In this equilibrium the allocation
is the one that maximizes the utility of the best types. This is an attractive
solution concept because it allows for pooling of types in equilibrium, which
can then lead to equilibrium default.
By contrast, the Nash equilibrium outcome would have the feature that
the best types restrict their borrowing so much that there is never any default
in period 2. While this would still deliver our main results in the model pre-
sented in this paper (since the initial loan is speciﬁed exogenously here), Nash
equilibrium has the unattractive feature that were one to extend the model
and endogenize the borrowing in period 0, it would be diﬃcult to generate
default in period 1. The reason is that ”cream-skimming” would give the
good types an incentive to reduce their borrowing to the fully collateralized
level.
143.3.4 Equilibrium Allocations
Given these borrowing constraints and this equilibrium concept, we now de-
rive the optimal allocations in the bottom node. We will show that the
equilibrium of the borrowing game is characterized by one of three possible
“regimes.” First, there is a “safe” regime where the bad type’s borrowing
constraints are respected and there is no default — neither in period 1 nor
period 2; in this case both types are pooled together. Conversely, there is
a “default” regime where the bad types default in period 1 and are thereby
separated from the good types. Finally, there is a “risky” regime in which
there is no default in period 1, yet the level of borrowing in that period is
suﬃciently high that default occurs in period 2. We will demonstrate in the
sections below that the choice of regime depends both on the parameters β
and k, as well as the market-clearing housing price p1d.8
We begin by considering the interest rate r0, which is due at the start
of period 1 (on account of borrowing in period 0). As discussed earlier, in
equilibrium none of the good agents will default. In addition, suppose that
a fraction q ∈ [0,1] of the bad types also repay in period 1.
Then the initial interest rate r0 that those agents who do not default must
pay is determined as follows:
1/2 × r0 +1 /2 × [(1 − β) × r0 + βq× r0 + β(1 − q) × p1d]=1
This simply states that the total payment per unit must equal the amount
borrowed. The agents all repay in the top node (which occurs with proba-
bility 1/2). In addition, in the bottom node all of the good types (measure
1−β) and a fraction q of the bad types also repay. The remaining bad types
8In this sense our model shares some similarities with Mester (1994), who develops a
model to explain why interest rates on credit cards are “sticky.” As in our paper, a change
in a macroeconomic variable can aﬀect the degree of pooling of types in equilibrium.
15(of measure β×[1−q]) default and surrender their collateral, which is worth
p1d per unit. Observe that lenders always break even in expectation in every
period (i.e. over the two nodes). If there is default in period 1, for example,
so that the bad types do not all repay in the bottom node, this raises the
interest rate r0, which must be paid by all agents in the top node, and by
the good types in the bottom node as well (so it can potentially aﬀect their
consumption).
As far as the borrowing in period 1, recall that under the Wilson-Miyazaki
solution concept, the equilibriumlevel of borrowing will be determined by the
best allocation for the good type. Before analyzing the good type’s decisions
more formally, it is useful to ﬁrst study the behavior of the bad types when
they default in the bottom node of period 1. In this case they are identiﬁed
as bad (since the good types never default) and so the borrowing constraint
(1) derived above binds; since they will therefore never be able to borrow so
much that they default in period 2, they thus face an interest rate of r1d =1 .
Given their quasi-linear preferences, they would like to borrow b1d so as
to maximize




subject to their borrowing constraint. Given that p2d =1 /2 and i1 =1 /2, it
is easy to see that the optimal value is b1d =2 p1 +1 4 p1 − 2. This never less
than the constrained level bmax(1/2,k)=
4kp1d+1
4p1d−2 (which we derived above)
whenever k ≤ 1/2, so this constraint will in fact always bind when the bad
types default and they will borrow bmax(1/2,k).












16the term −2k results from the fact that (i) the agents are defaulting in
period 1, and then (ii) borrowing their maximum into period 2 (the maximal
borrowing leaves them indiﬀerent to defaulting or not in period 2, hence the
extra −k).
We now turn our attention to the good types; these agents essentially
determine the equilibrium allocations. There are three possibilities.
1. Safe Regime
First of all, the good type may choose to restrict his borrowing so that
the bad type does not default in period 2 (after repaying in period
1); we term this “safe borrowing,” since there will be no default in
period 2. That is, he could restrict his borrowing to be no more than
bmax(i1 − 2(p1d − r0),k), which is deﬁned by:




where now r1d = 1. It is not diﬃcult to see that the good type will
always want to borrow up to this maximum; to see this, recall that the
borrowing constraint (1) was binding for the bad type when he defaults,
and when agents repay they are poorer, which means both that their
constraint is tighter and that they wish to borrow even more.
Furthermore, notice the best allocation of this type for both the good
and bad agents will occur when everyone repays in period 1 — i.e.,
when q = 1. This is because the initial interest rate r0 is decreasing
in q (reaching a minimum of 1 at q = 1) while r1d = 1 is constant in
q when the borrowing is restricted to ensure that there is no default.
This implies that any such equilibrium will have q = 1, in which case
17r0 = 1 and the borrowing simpliﬁes to
bmax(1/2 − 2(p1d − 1),k)=
4(1 + k)p1d − 3
4p1d − 2
.
Observe that this is increasing in the bad type’s default cost k, since
a higher k means that they are more reluctant to default (in period 2)
and hence can be trusted to repay more.
It is important to note that this is an admissible candidate equilbrium
only when the bad types are indeed willing to repay in period 1 in order
to then borrow on these terms. So for the bad types to be willing to
repay in period 1, it must be the case that the utility they derive from
repaying and pooling with the good types is at least as high as the
utility — calculated in (3) above — that they get from defaulting and
separating themselves.
That is, the bad types will repay when



















Solving this, we can determine that when q = 1 and the borrowing is
at the maximal safe level, the bad agents are willing to repay when p1d
is above
pnodef ≡
1+ek (3 − 2k)+2k
4ek .
For the extreme case of k = 0 we have pnodef =1 , which means that
the bad agents would never want to repay under these terms (and so
this regime would not exist). In general, however, pnodef will be below
1, since a higher k both makes default more costly and increases the
18maximal safe borrowing level.
2. Default Regime
Conversely, the good types may want to encourage the bad types to
all default in period 1. In this case we would still have r1d = 1 (this
time because we are in a separating equilibrium), but because q =0w e
would have r0 =
2−βp1d
2−β > 1. As before, this is an admissible candidate
equilibrium only when the bad types do indeed prefer to default. That
is, the utility that the bad types receive from defaulting in period 1 —
calculated in (3) above — must exceed that which they would receive
from repaying and then pooling with the good types. This implies
a restrction both on the good types’ borrowing (it must not be too
high) as well as on the house price p1d (it must be suﬃciently low). In







− 2k ≥ log
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where the right-hand side is the utility the bad types would receive
from repaying in period 1.
When p1d is suﬃciently high the solution to (4) is not be an admissible
candidate; that is, this regime would not exist. One way to see this
is to observe that another alternative that is always available to the
good types is to repay but then borrow the fully collateralized level
bmax(1/2 − 2(p1d − r0),k) instead (which they could do even if lenders
were aware of their type). When p1d is high the bad types’ income after
repaying would also be fairly high and so the fully collateralized level
would actually exceed the solution to (4). In particular, for the bad
19types to be willing to default we must have p1d below
pdef ≡





this is obtained simply by setting the fully collateralized level equal to
the solution to (4) and then solving for p1d.
Intuitively, this cutoﬀ is decreasing in the bad types’ default cost k (it
is equal to p1d = 1 when k = 0). It is also decreasing in the fraction
of bad types β, because the more bad types there are the higher the
initial interest rate r0 and thus the more attractive it is to default. It
is not hard to show that pdef >p nodef.9
Below this cutoﬀ price, the solution to (4), which is the maximal
amount the good types can borrow and still leave the bad types at






ek (2p1d − 1)
;
it is easy to see that since this is below the good types’ optimum, the
constraint will in fact bind.
As is evident from this discussion, this regime will arise when the price
p1d is suﬃciently low, in which case there will be default in equilibrium.
3. Risky Regime
The ﬁnal set of possible allocations occur when there are (at least) some
bad types who repay in the initial period, and the borrowing in period
1 by those agents who did repay is greater than the fully collateralized
9This reﬂects the non-convexity that arises in this model; when all of the bad types
default, the interest rate is higher, which makes repaying less attractive.
20safe level (so that there is default in period 2). In this case we will have
q>0 and r1d > 1.
The interest rate r1d(b) that is paid in period 2 (on account of period-1




× r1d × b +
βq
(1 − β)+βq




The left-hand side is the amount borrowed. On the right we have the
amount repaid: the good types repay the entire loan of b (since it will
necessarily be less than their borrowing constraint as derived above),
while the bad types default and repay only their collateral, which is
worth (i1 +2 ( p1d − r0)+b)
p2d
p1d in period 2. It is not hard to derive a
(messy) closed-form expression for r1d(b), which is increasing in b,β,
and q.
There are two possibilities. Either 0 <q<1 (i.e. not all the bad
types repay), in which case the bad types must be indiﬀerent between
repaying and defaulting in period 1 for this to be an equilibrium, or
else q = 1 (all repay), in which case the bad types must weakly prefer
to repay.
When 0 <q<1, then to make the bad types indiﬀerent, the borrowing
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where now r0 =
2−β (1−q)p1d
2−β (1−q) .
It is possible to show that in this case the good types’ utility is max-
imized as q → 0, for all admissible values of p1d,β or k. That is, the
good types would like to ensure that in fact all of the bad types default
21in period 1. The reason is that the increase in the initial interest rate r0
this would entail is more than compensated for by the fact that, when
the bad agents all default, the good types can borrow risklessly from
period 1 to 2 (recall that those agents who default are identiﬁed as bad
and are not in this pool). This is in fact the default regime we have
analyzed above.
So without loss of generality we assume q = 1. In this case the bad
types must weakly prefer to repay over defaulting in period 1, that is,
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that is, bindiﬀ(1) is deﬁned as the minimal borrowing needed to make
the bad types willing to repay in period 1 when q = 1. In this equation
the left-hand side is the utility that the bad types would receive were
they to default in period 1 and the right-0hand side gives the utility
from repaying and then borrowing bindiﬀ(1).10
A candidate Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium will be the value of b that
maximizes the utility of the good types subject to this constraint as
well as subject to the borrowing constraint, which in this case is that
the good types must be willing to repay r1d(b) × b; this was derived in
(2) above.
When q = 1 the good types’ utility is
log
"
i1 +2 ( p1d − 1) + b
p1d
#
+[ i1 +2 ( p1d − 1) + b]
p2d
p1d
− r1d(b) × b (5)
It is not hard to show that, for the parameter values we consider,
10The −k reﬂects the fact that the bad types will then default in period 2.
22the borrowing constraint (2) never binds, because as b increases the
interest rate r1d(b) increases rapidly enough to make further borrowing
unattractive to the good types.
As above, the value of b that maximizes (5) will be an admissible can-
didate allocation only for house prices p1d that are suﬃciently low. The
reason is that for this “risky” regime to exist, by deﬁnition this solution
must exceed the safe level of borrowing bmax(1/2−2(p1d −1),k). When
β + k ≤ 1/2 this holds for all values of p1d < 1 (because when β and
k are low, the safe borrowing level is low relative to the risky level, as








In this case the value of b that maximizes the good types’ utility (5) is
brisky =




In addition, recall that we had a further constraint: the bad types must
all be willing to repay in period 1 and borrow brisky. That is, we must
have brisky ≥ bindiﬀ(1) as derived above. This occurs if and only if
the fraction of bad types β satisﬁes
β ≤ 1 −
1+2k
2ek .
That is, we must have β and k suﬃciently small for the bad types
to be willing to repay. The reason is that with high k the bad types
can borrow a lot when they default; similarly, when β is high then the
adverse selection problem is relatively severe when they repay, which
means that they cannot borrow enough to make repayment worthwhile.
234 Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibria of the Borrowing Game
To summarize the discussion of the previous sections, the Wilson-Miyazaki
equilibrium is determined by choosing the best allocation for the good types
among the following candidates, which we term “Safe” (S), “Default” (D),
and “Risky” (R).
The candidate regimes are as follows:
1. Safe: All agents repay in period 1 and then borrow bmax(1/2−2(p1d −
1),k), which is the maximal safe level (so no agent defaults in period
2). This can occur only when p1d ≥ pnodef.
2. Risky: Everyone repays in period 1, and then borrows brisky. The




and β ≤ 1 − 1+2k
2ek .
3. Default: The bad types default in period 1 and then borrow bmax(1/2,k).
The good types repay and borrow bdef, which leaves the bad types in-
diﬀerent to defaulting. This can occur only when p1d ≤ pdef.
In general the choice of which regime is best for the good types must be
determined via numerical simulation, which we carry out for several examples
below. However, we can make several qualitative statements.
Remark: If we trace out the equilibria as a function of the period-1 housing
price p1d, then there are ﬁve possible combinations of these regimes, depend-
ing on the parameters β and k. They are S-D-R (i.e., all regimes), S-D (no
risky), S-R (no default), R-D (no safe), and R (only risky). Figure 2 below
characterizes the parameter space in terms of these regions, and we provide
further discussion and examples below.
24• First of all, the arrangement of regimes is hierarchical, in the sense
that as we lower the price p1d, we go from safe, to risky, to default,
although not all of these will necessarily occur for any given parameter
pair (β,k).
• Since pdef >p nodef, there is always an equilibrium.
• If β and k are suﬃciently close to 0, then there is only a risky regime.
• If 1 −
1+2k
2ek <β , there is no risky regime, only safe and default.
• The safe regime is always strictly preferred by the good types over the
default regime. So when p1d >p nodef, the safe regime is chosen.
Figure 2: The Regimes
254.2 Accelerators and Decelerators
The various classes of equilibria that we described above lead to very diﬀerent
outcomes in terms of the eﬀect of aggregate ﬂuctuations on house prices.
When we are in the safe regime, total period-1 housing consumption by
the strategic consumers is 2− 1−2k
2p1d−1. Observe that as p1d decreases, consump-
tion also goes down. This is because in the safe regime the equilibrium is
determined by the no-default constraint of the risky types which gets tighter
as the house price falls (because their remaining income after repaying the
initial loan is lower). This regime will generate a classic ﬁnancial accelerator
as in much of the literature.
By contrast, in the risky regime, the consumers’ housing demand is
2(1−β)
2p1d−1.
No longer is it the case that demand decreases as the price falls. The reason
is that in the risky regime the good types allow the bad ones to free-ride and
do not try to limit their borrowing to the safe level. While this free-riding
reduces the good types’ demand (observe the term 1 − β in the numerator),
this does not get worse as the price falls.
Finally, in the default regime, total consumption of housing is given by
1+2k
ek (2p1d−1); this is the weighted average of consumption by the good and bad
types. As in the risky regime, while adverse selection reduces consumption
relative to the ﬁrst-best (since k<1), this is not exacerbated by declining
prices.
In addition to the eﬀect of falling prices within each regime, we also need
to compare consumption across regimes. As discussed above, as prices fall
we go from the safe, to the risky, and ﬁnally the default regime (although
not all of these will necessarily occur for all parameter values). It is easy to
see that consumption in the risky and default regimes will exceed that of the
safe regime when those regimes are chosen by the good types. However, by
comparing consumption in the two regimes, it is also not hard to see that
consumption in the default regime exceeds that of the risky regime only when
26β>1 −
1+2k
2ek , which is precisely when the risky regime does not exist. So
going from the risky to the default regime entails a drop in aggregate housing
demand.
Thus in our model we can have (i) a “standard” accelerator in the safe
regime and (ii) a discrete deceleration and/or acceleration as the equilibrium
jumps from one regime to another.
In particular, the combinations of the regimes yield the following as the
house price falls from p1d =1 :
• R: neither accelerator nor decelerator
• S-D: accelerator for p1d close to 1 and decelerator for lower p1d
• S-R: accelerator for p1d close to 1 and decelerator for lower p1d
• R-D: accelerator for low p1d only
• S-R-D: accelerator for p1d close to 1, then decelerator, then accelerator
again for low p1d
The key goal of this paper, developing a model in which equilibrium is
characterized by a ﬁnancial accelerator when house prices are high but by
stabilization when prices are low, is characteristic of regimes S-D and S-R,
which together make up the majority of the parameter space. Also observe
that even when we shift from the risky to the default regime and strategic
demand falls, it is still the case that consumption is higher than it would be
if the no-default constraint of the safe regime were in eﬀect.
We will give some examples of these regimes in the following sections.
4.3 General Equilibrium
As discussed above, this is a small open economy, in which the cost of funds
in this economy is ﬁxed at 1. Thus only the housing prices p1d,p 1u,p 2d,p 2u
27are determined in equilibrium, with the strategic agents’ demand for housing
derived from the equilibrium of the borrowing game.
We noted earlier that since utility is quasi-linear in the second period,
supply of housing is 2 units, and consumers are assumed to have suﬃcient
funds in period 2, the second-period prices will always be p2u =2=p2d.
As far as period 1, suppose that the measure of strategic consumers is σ
(and 2−σ for the non-strategic) and that the outside (non-strategic) spending
on housing is δd and δu in the bottom and top nodes. We will focus attention
of the bottom node; the top node is discussed in the appendix.
In the safe regime, we have determined that the demand by the strategic
agents is 2 − 1−2k











We would like the law of demand to hold in this economy — that is, as the
outside housing demand falls, we would like the price to fall as well. In order
for this to be the case, however, it is important that there not be too many
strategic consumers in the economy, since in the safe regime their borrowing
constraints lead to a ﬁnancial accelerator in which falling prices decrease their
demand. By examining the above market-clearing condition, it can be seen
that for the parameter values we consider below, it is suﬃcient for strategic
agents to make up less than two thirds of the population, i.e., σ<2/3.
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28In addition, since there are non-convexities in this economy (due both to
the discrete default decision as well as the discrete default costs) we need to
randomize in the standard way when switching between regimes.
Although it is possible to derive (messy) closed-form solutions for the
house price in each of these regimes, it is more useful to examine speciﬁc
numerical examples, which we do in the following section.
5 Examples
In this section we present several examples that illustrate the possible types
of equilibria that can occur in our model. We will take half the population
to be strategic consumers (σ =0 .5) and assume the default cost for the bad
types is k =0 .; this gives us the widest possible range of equilibria.
The ﬁrst case we consider is β =0 .4. Referring to Figure 2 above, we can
see that these parameters correspond to the S−D equilibria, that is, the safe
regime for high values of p1d and the default equilibrium for low values. This
combination occurs because (i) with a relatively high value of k (k =0 .4) it
is not too costly for the good types to restrict their borrowing to the level at
which the bad still repay and (ii) with many bad types (β =0 .4) the risky
equilibrium — in which the bad types default — would be very costly for
them. Recall that this is the leading case for the paper — we have a ﬁnancial
accelerator for high values of the house price, but stabilization obtains for
low prices.
We choose the per capita spending by the outside sector δd so as to
calibrate the model at p1d = 1. We then lower δd; the results are plotted
below. As we do so, the price clearly falls. Observe that the slope is relatively
steep; this reﬂects the ﬁnancial accelerator.
When we hit p1d = pnodef =0 .85, the bad types no longer wish to repay
and we switch to the default regime. Observe that when we switch regimes
29the slope of the price as a function of δ is shallower — this reﬂects the fact
that when the bad types default in period 1, their wealth in this period no
longer decreases as the house price falls (since lenders seize their collateral).
Although lenders recoup some of their losses in the form of a higher interest
rate (paid by the good types, who do not default), the rest is paid in the top
node (where the price is much higher). Thus the net eﬀect on consumption
is positive — that is, default endogenously serves as a stabilizing force.
Figure 3: Regimes S-D: β =0 .4
Now suppose that β =0 .1. These parameters correspond to the case in
which there is no default regime. For high prices we are in the safe regime,
with its ﬁnancial accelerator, and for low prices, we are in the risky regime.
Once again default serves as a stabilizing force, although this time it is default
in period 2; that is, for low prices the good types ﬁnd it too costly to restrict
their borrowing to the safe level. We perform the same exercise as in the
30previous example; observe that there is now a ﬂat region between the safe
and risky regimes in which we must randomize.
Figure 4: Regimes S-R: β =0 .1
Finally, let β =0 .15 and σ =0 .1.11 We now have the mixed case S-R-D,
in which all of the regimes appear. Notice that there is a discrete jump down
when we switch from the risky to the default regime, although both the level
of the price is higher than it would have been had we restricted all agents
to the safe level regime, and its slope shallower. As discussed above, for
parameters in this region we do not have a clean transition from accelerator
to decelerator as the price falls.
11We needed to lower the fraction of strategic agents in this example so that the non-
convexity that occurs when we switch from the risky to the default regime does not force
us into the region where the good agents would default as well.
31Figure 5: Regimes S-R-D: β =0 .15
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model of secured borrowing in which a
drop in the value of the underlying collateral can generate strategic default,
which in turn can serve to stabilize aggregate ﬂuctuations because it leaves
agents with more wealth precisely when the house price is lowest. Strategic
default arises in equilibrium because the presence of adverse selection means
that default is not always ruled out by binding borrowing constraints.
There are several directions in which this model could be extended. One
interesting avenue would be to endogenize the partially collateralized debt
contract agents use to borrow. This paper also simpliﬁes the eﬀect of de-
fault on the banking sector — obviously a rash of bank failures induced by
a sharp increase in borrower default could have serious consequences. Fi-
32nally, it would be interesting to interact our stabilizer with a simple model
of investment in which home equity served to secure business loans, as does
indeed seem to be increasingly common. Such a model would also generate
interesting tradeoﬀs and might allow our mechanism to engender positive
real eﬀects for the economy as a whole.
7 Appendix - the Top Node
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the top node. Because of the agents’ quasi-
linear utility functions, the equilibrium housing price in period 2 will be
p2u =1 /2 (as in the bottom node).
As far as period 1, it is easy to see that the maximal interest rate will be
r0 = 9
8. In order to keep the analysis focused on the bottom node, we will
restrict attention to parameters in which there is no default in the top node,
neither in period 1 nor period 2. For this it is suﬃcient to assume that the
outside demand δu is chosen so as to ensure that p1u >
11
8 . It is then the case
that the optimal borrowing from period 1 to period 2 can always be fully
collateralized and the equilibrium in the bottom node would have no eﬀect
on the housing price in the top node.
Alternatively, one could allow parameter values that yield a lower equi-
librium price p1u. In this case the borrowing would be constrained (as in the
analysis of the bottom node above) and then default in the bottom node —
which raises r0 — would reduce wealth in the top node and thereby tighten
borrowing constraints in this node and lead to a lower housing price p1u.
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